

D.3.1. Country and Society Brief

Deliverable submitted May 2011(M5) in fulfillment of requirements of the FP7 project, Cultures of Governance and Conflict Resolution in Europe and India (CORE)

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Country and Society Brief

The Country and Society Brief is the first report in a series of background papers, which intend to lay the foundation of the project. By analysing the historical, economic and political context of our six case studies, this report sets out CORE's understanding of the conflicts concerned. The main aim of this report is to provide background information, introduce the main conflict actors and their agendas and to compare conflict resolution and basic governance strategies applied to the cases of Bihar, Bosnia, Cyprus, Georgia, Kashmir and Northeast India. It also provides an overview of recent developments and their historic background rather than in-depth case studies. Hence, it is only a first approach to the topic to collect empirical information about the divergence of contexts, actors and strategies involved in conflict resolution.

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I Bihar

1.1 Background of conflict(s)

Bihar is penetrated by the so-called Maoist red corridor, stretching from parts of West Bengal, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka to parts of Maharashtra, mostly covering areas beleaguered by illiteracy and abject poverty. The state is afflicted with class and caste conflicts, the most visible manifestation of which is the so-called 'Naxalite conflict'.

The history of Naxalite unrest in the rural south of Bihar dates back to the 1970s, when the first mass-mobilisation against feudal forces begun in Bhojpur. Today Naxalites are active in over 33 of Bihar's 38 districts. The Naxalite movement is scattered, and includes several fractions. The cycle of violence between Naxalites and state forces resulted in killings of civilians as well as security personnel, while the state has been facing reoccurring massacres throughout the past four decades.

The protracted social conflicts observed in the states of Bihar and Jharkhand, across 'oppressed/ exploited' class. The composition of these categories and the specificities of their agendas vary over time and from region to region.

The following paragraphs analyze these two categories and their representative organizations by characterizing the actors involved, while also elaborating their common agendas. For the sake of analytical clarity, the composition of the actors from the plains (present-day State of Bihar) and those from the plateau region (present-day State of Jharkhand) will be examined separately.

1.2 Core indicators

Bihar is a state in eastern India. It is located mid-way between West Bengal in the east and Uttar Pradesh (UP) in the west and it is bounded by Nepal to the north and by

Jharkhand to the south. Bihar is the twelfth largest state in the country in terms of geographical extension and the third largest by population.¹

Persons	Male	Female	Growth (%) 1991-2001	Population density /km 2001	Literacy rate (%)	Males (%)	Females (%)
82,878,796	43,153,964	39,724,832	28.43	880	47.53	60.32	33.57

Source: Census of India, 2001

Wealth distribution and core indicators of economic 'development'

Bihar is a rural state with more than 80% of its population living in villages. Agriculture is the main source of income. Despite a vast pool of natural resources and water, Bihar is the poorest state in India and lags far behind other states in terms of literacy rates. According to the 2001 Census less half of Bihar's inhabitants are able to read and write.² The state has been plagued by the problem of access to resources (particularly in relation to the people belonging to the poorest segments of the society), displacement and the loss of government's legitimacy over the last two decades. In Bihar the socio-economic gaps between social groups are pronounced and there are considerable economic disparities across the various districts.³

Between 2004 and 2011 Bihar had one of the highest economic growth rates in India.⁴ However, the state is struggling with an 'image problem',⁵ which damages its prospects for economic development. In popular media the word 'Bihar' has become a synonym for 'backwardness': widespread poverty, corrupt politicians, cooperating with mafia-dons,

1 In 2001 the population was estimated to stand at 83 million (World Bank, Towards a Development Strategy, 2005,

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINDIA/Resources/Bihar_report_final_June2005.pdf)

2 The literacy rate is confined to 47.53 percent of the population (Government of India, Census of India, 2001, <http://www.censusindia.gov.in/>)

3 Government of Bihar, "Economic Survey 2010-11", 2011, accessed 7.3.2011 at <http://finance.bih.nic.in/Bud2011/Economic-Survey-2011-English.pdf>; Yoko Tsjudita et al, "Development and Intra-state Disparities in Bihar", Economic and Political Weekly, xlv: 50, 2010.

4 Government of Bihar, "Economic Survey".

5 World Bank, "Towards a Development Strategy".

and a caste-ridden, hierarchical society.⁶ In 2005, the World Bank discussed Bihar's persistent poverty, complex social stratification, unsatisfactory infrastructure and weak governance in the state.⁷

Demography and composition of society

Rather than classifying the social composition along ethnic lines, peoples of Bihar are more often classified according to language, religion, social caste, lineage or class. Hindus constitute the majority of the population of Bihar. Muslims are the largest minority group. There are also smaller groups of 'distinct indigenous peoples' (termed Scheduled tribes)⁸, as well as a smaller number of Christians,⁹ Sikhs and Buddhists. The Scheduled casts are predominantly Hindu, and count for about 15% of the population, living primarily in rural areas.¹⁰ The main official languages are Hindi and Urdu as well as Maithili, but the majority of people speak distinct dialects classified as subgroups of Hindi, known as Bhojpuri and Magadhi.

The borders and boundaries have played a crucial role in the making, unmaking and remaking of the state. While studying contemporary Bihar, one cannot disregard Jharkhand, which was carved out of the state's southern part in 2000. Hence, both Bihar and Jharkhand are the focus of the 'Bihar case study'. Jharkhand shares its border with the states of Bihar to the north, UP and Chhattisgarh to the west, Orissa to the south, and West Bengal to the east. Jharkhand, known for its vast forest resources, is the leading producer of mineral wealth in the country, endowed with a vast variety of minerals like

6 see eg. BBC, "Where 'Backward' Bihar leads India", accessed 7.3.2011, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6263984.stm, 2007; The Economist, "An area of Darkness", 2004, Accessed 7.3.2011, at <http://www.economist.com/node/2423102>; The Hindu, "Centre allots Rs. 4,670 cr for backward districts", 2009, accessed 7.3.2011, at <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article55102.ece>.

7 World Bank, "Towards a Development Strategy."

8 Census of India, "Bihar, Data Highlights: The scheduled casts", 2001a, Accessed 7.3.2011, at http://censusindia.gov.in/Tables_Published/SCST/dh_sc_bihar.pdf

9 Britannica Online Edition, Bihar, 2011, Accessed 7.3.2011 at: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/65099/Bihar/46144/People>

10 Census of India, "Bihar. Data Highlights: The scheduled tribes", 2001b, Accessed 7.3.2011, at http://censusindia.gov.in/Tables_Published/SCST/dh_st_bihar.pdf

iron ore, coal, copper ore, mica, bauxite, graphite, limestone, and uranium. Jharkhand's mineral wealth has made little difference to the lives of ordinary people though due to distortions in distribution and access to resources. Furthermore, frequent flooding, hampers economic development in Jharkhand.

1.3 Formal and Informal actors and agendas

The Actors of the conflict

The poor peasants as well as the landless agricultural laborers are classified as 'backward' castes. Together with the scheduled castes and tribes, in both the plain and plateau regions, these 'backward' castes were unanimously identified by scholars as the groups comprising the exploited class.¹¹

There is also unanimity of scholarly opinion that the exploited sections were organized by various organizations espousing Leftist ideologies¹², active in different parts of the States. In the plains the active groups were the Vinod Mishra-led Central Committee of Party Unity,¹³ Maoist Communist Centre,¹⁴ Bihar Pradesh Kisan Samiti,¹⁵ Mazdoor Kisan Sangram Samiti and Indian People's Front.¹⁶

11 Pradhan H. Prasad, "Agrarian Unrest and Economic Change in Rural Bihar: Three Case Studies" in *Economic and Political Weekly*, 10: 24 (1975): 931, 933-937; Harry W. Blair, "Rising Kulaks and Backward Classes in Bihar: Social Change in the Late 1970s", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 15: 2, (12 January 1980): 64-74; Nirmal Sengupta, "Class and Tribe in Jharkhand", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 15:14, (5 April 1980): 664-671; Arvind N. Das, "Landowners' Armies Take over 'Law and Order'", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 21:1 (4 January 1986): 15+17-18; D. N., "Agrarian Movement in Palamu", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 23: 34, (20 August 1988a): 1726-1729; D. N., "Problem of Unity in the Agrarian Struggle: Case of Bihar", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 23 : 19 (7 May, 1988b): 941-943; Victor Das, "Jharkhand Movement: From Realism to Mystification", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 25: 30 (28 July 1990): 1624-1626; Krishna Chaitanya, "Caste, Class and Agrarian Movements in Bihar", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 28 : 22 (29 May 1993): 1082-1084; Krishna Chaitanya, "Social Justice, Bihar Style", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 26 : 46 (16 November 1991): 2612; Ghosh, Arunabha, "Ideology and Politics of Jharkhand Movement: An Overview", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 28: 35 (28 August 1993): 1788-1790; Tilak D. Gupta, "Review: Behind the Violence in Rural Bihar", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 29: 12 (19 March 1994): 679 – 681; Arvind Sinha and Indu Sinha, "State, Class and 'Sena' Nexus: Bathani Tola Massacre", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 31 : 44 (2 November 1996): 2908-2912.; Arvind Sinha, "Social Mobilisation in Bihar: Bureaucratic Feudalism and Distributive Justice", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 31 : 51 (21 December 1996): 3287-3289; Alakh N. Sharma, "Agrarian Relations and Socio-Economic Change in Bihar", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 40 : 10 (5 March 2005): 960-972.; Bela Bhatia, "The Naxalite Movement in Central Bihar", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 40 :14 (9 April 2005): 1536-1549.

12 Prasad, "Agrarian Unrest", 931, 933-937; Das, "Landowners' Armies", 15/17/18; Chaitanya, "Social Justice", 2612; Gupta, "Behind the Violence", 679 – 681; Sinha, "Social Mobilisation", 3287-3289; Bhatia, "The Naxalite Movement", 1536-1549.

13 D. N., "Agrarian Movement", 1726-1729; Chaitanya, "Caste, Class and Agrarian Movements", 1082-1084; Bhatia, "The Naxalite Movement", 1536-1549.

Since the exploited groups in the plateau region were also comprised of poor tribals and migrant industrial labourers¹⁷ along with agricultural labourers and poor peasants, some other organizations were also active in the region. These included Jan Chetna Manch, Jharkhand Kranti Dal¹⁸; Birsa Sewa Dal¹⁹, Sivaji Samaj, Marxist Coordination Committee,²⁰ Jharkhand Mukti Morcha²¹, etc.

By contrast, the oppressor/exploiter class in the plains was mostly rooted in the landed elite with the capitalist landlord element gaining prominence in the latter half of the 20th century. For most of the first half of the 20th century, the upper-class landed elite comprising of big and small landlords and rich peasants who came from the upper castes of the Rajputs, Bhumihaar and Kayastha.²² However, within the first two decades after independence, in the wake of the abolition of the *zamindari* system and the Green Revolution, the emerging new landed elites were the rich peasants of the 'backward' caste of Koeris, Kurmis and Yadava.²³ When faced with the challenge of the exploited

14 D. N., "Agrarian Movement", 1726-1729; D. N., "Problem of Unity", 941-943; Bhatia, "The Naxalite Movement", 1536-1549.

15 D. N., "Problem of Unity", 941-943; Chaitanya, "Caste, Class and Agrarian Movements", 1082-1084; Bhatia, "The Naxalite Movement", 1536-1549.

16 Chaitanya, "Caste, Class and Agrarian Movements", 1082-1084; Bhatia, "The Naxalite Movement", 1536-1549.

17 Prasad, "Agrarian Unrest", 931, 933-937; Sengupta, "Class and Tribe", 664-671; Das, "Jharkhand Movement", 1624-1626; Ghosh, "Ideology and Politics", 1788-1790. Prakash, Amit, "Jharkhand: Politics of Development and Identity", Orient Longman, New Delhi: 2001.

18 D. N., "Problem of Unity", 941-943.

19 Prakash, "Jharkhand".

20 Prakash, "Jharkhand".

21 Das, "Jharkhand Movement", 1624-1626; Prakash, "Jharkhand".

22 Blair, "Rising Kulaks", 64-74; D. N., "Agrarian Movement", 1726-1729; Sinha, "Social Mobilisation", 3287-3289; Shashi Bhushan Singh, "Limits to Power: Naxalism and Caste Relations in a South Bihar Village", Economic and Political Weekly, 40 : 29 (16 July 2005): 3167-75.

23 Prasad, "Agrarian Unrest", 931, 933-937; Blair, "Rising Kulaks", 64-74; Das, "Jharkhand Movement", 1624-1626; D. N., "Agrarian Movement", 1726-1729; Chaitanya, "Caste, Class and Agrarian Movements", 1082-1084; Gupta, "Behind the Violence", 679 – 681; Sinha, "Social Mobilisation", 3287-3289; Walter Hauser, "From Peasant Soldiering to Peasant Activism: Reflections on the Transition of a Martial Tradition in the Flaming Fields of Bihar", Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 47: 3 (2004): 401-434; Sharma, "Agrarian Relations", 960-972, Singh, "Limits to Power", 3167-75.

class mobilized under the Leftist organizations, this new landed elite raised armed bands or *senas* along caste lines.²⁴ The exploiter class in the plateau region comprised of *zamindars*, moneylenders, state officials and private industrialists who were collectively seen as *dikus*, a tribal term for ‘outsider/exploiter’.²⁵

Agendas of the Conflict

In large parts of Bihar the oppressor/exploiter class has depended heavily on its influence over the state and its administrative machinery to maintain its “extra-constitutional domain of power”²⁶. They have employed “violence as a mode of surplus accumulation”²⁷ in collaboration with the state machinery to maintain the status quo.²⁸

On the other hand, the agenda of the oppressed/exploited classes has varied from region to region over certain key issues. The first among them has been land reforms in terms of redistribution of surplus land in the plains and restoration of community-held tribal land in the plateau.²⁹ The second has been the demand for ending of caste and tribe-based

24 Blair, “Rising Kulaks”, 64-74; Das, “Landowners' Armies”, 15+17-18; Mishra, 1991; Gupta, “Behind the Violence”, 679 – 681; Sinha and Sinha, “State, Class and 'Sena' Nexus”, 2912; Jha, Praveen K, “Resistance and Rebellion in Contemporary Bihar's Agrarian Landscape: Some Reflections on the Context, the Actors and the Scripts”, International Conference on Bihar in the World and the World in Bihar, Asian Development Research Institute, Patna, 1997: 1-24; Hauser, “From Peasant Soldiering”, 401-434.

25 Das, “Landowners' Armies”, 15+17-18; D. N., “Problem of Unity”, 941-943; Ghosh, “Ideology and Politics”, 1788-1790; Prakash, “Jharkhand”; Alpa Shah, “Markets of Protection: The ‘Terrorist’ Maoist Movement and the State in Jharkhand, India”, Critique of Anthropology, 26:3 (2006): 297–314.

26 The concept has been borrowed from Sinha and Sinha (“State, Class and 'Sena' Nexus”, 2912). See also: Prasad, “Agrarian Unrest”, 931, 933-937; N., “Agrarian Movement”, 1726-1729; Sinha and Sinha, “State, Class and 'Sena' Nexus”, 2908-2912; Anand Chakravarti, “Caste and Agrarian Class: A View from Bihar”, Economic and Political Weekly, 36 : 17 (28 April 2001): 1449-1462; Sharma, “Agrarian Relations”, 960-972.

27 The idea has been put forth by Sharma (“Agrarian Relations”, 968).

28 Das, “Landowners' Armies”, 15+17-18.; Gupta 1994; Sinha and Sinha, “State, Class and 'Sena' Nexus”, 2908-2912; Chakravarti, “Caste and Agrarian Class”, 1449-1462; Sharma, “Agrarian Relations”, 960-972.

29 Prasad, “Agrarian Unrest”, 931, 933-937; Sengupta, “Class and Tribe”, 664-671; Chaitanya, “Social Justice, Bihar Style”, 2612; Ghosh, “Ideology and Politics”, 1788-1790; Sinha and Sinha, “State, Class and 'Sena' Nexus”, 2908-2912; Chakravarti, “Caste and Agrarian Class”, 1449-1462; Hauser, “From Peasant Soldiering; Sharma, “Agrarian Relations”, 968; Bhatia, “The Naxalite Movement”, 1536-1549.

discrimination and exploitation.³⁰ Besides, there was the demand for better wages for agricultural labourers, share-croppers and industrial workers.³¹ Another set of demands included access to common property resources like *gairmarjua* land, forest resources and water sources.³²

In addition, the Jharkhand State was born in the interstices of claims of recognition of a distinct tribal heritage and culture and compulsions of democratic politics – many of which patterns have continued in the shape of contests over access and ownership over water, land and forests on the one hand while demands for greater (and often, different structural forms) of local governance on the other. A complex mixture of many of these overlapping lines of contests lies in the root of what is called Maoist or Naxal violence that permeates these states – something that is occupying the contemporary public policy imaginations.

1.4 Approaches to conflict resolution

Strategies for sustainable conflict resolution need to highlight the perspective of justice instead of the predominant perspective of national security. With regard to the access to resources in Bihar and Jharkhand the question of human security tends to be neglected. The issue of displacement and the other humanitarian and human rights issues are also crucial.

30 Prasad, “Agrarian Unrest”, 931, 933-937; Sengupta, “Class and Tribe”, 664-671; Chaitanya, “Social Justice, Bihar Style”, 2612; Chakravarti, “Caste and Agrarian Class”, 1449-1462; Hauser, “From Peasant Soldiering; Sharma, “Agrarian Relations”, 968; Sharma, “Agrarian Relations”, 968.

31 Prasad, “Agrarian Unrest”, 931, 933-937; Mukul, “Bihar's Land Liberation Struggles”, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 27 : 34 (22 August 1992): 1780-1781; Chaitanya, “Social Justice, Bihar Style”, 2612; Sinha and Sinha, “State, Class and 'Sena' Nexus”, 2908-2912; Chakravarti, “Caste and Agrarian Class”, 1449-1462.

32 Prasad, “Agrarian Unrest”, 931, 933-937; N., “Problem of Unity”, 941-943; Ghosh, “Ideology and Politics”, 1788-1790; Sinha and Sinha, “State, Class and 'Sena' Nexus”, 2908-2912; Bhatia, “The Naxalite Movement”, 1536-1549.

Moreover, there is a need to study the phenomenon of state violence. The issue of extra-judicial killings needs to be highlighted adequately. Elections quite often have been viewed as the only means of seeking legitimacy for the government, which has frequently given rise to pre-poll and post-poll violence in addition to the violence on the polling days in India.

Hence, there is a need for multi-layered, multiple-level dialogues. Focusing on a dialogue with the Maoist insurgents, aiming at ceasefires between the rebels and the state will remain insufficient to achieve a sustainable peace in the region. Dialogue will be necessary with the members of different segments of the society, and would enhance the peacebuilding capacity of the society.

Given their colonial origins, the Indian constitution and other national laws lack popular deliberations, generating the needs to explain those legal frameworks in the post-colonial context: Is it a collection of norms backed by the threat of state sanction or norms whose validity does not primarily stem from the state, but from the fact that these norms guarantee the autonomy of all legal persons equally? In fact, principles of justice and reconciliation call for new modes of dialogue beyond constitutional prescriptions for mediation, compromise and restraint.³³

1.5 Governance: Approaches and Institutions

The government's response to the violent conflict was biased especially in favour of the oppressor/ exploiter class. Excessive repression was employed by the state against the protesting poor in the name of upholding 'law and order' against the Naxalites.³⁴ Affected states moreover demanded the creation of a central anti-Naxal para military force.³⁵

33 Samaddar, Ranabir, "The Politics of Dialogue: Living Under the Geopolitical Histories of War and Peace", Aldershot/Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2004.

34 Prasad, "Agrarian Unrest", 931, 933-937; Chaitanya, "Social Justice, Bihar Style", 2612.

35 Chaitanya, "Social Justice, Bihar Style", 2612.

Simultaneously, some public policy responses aiming to improve the condition of the 'oppressed/ exploited classes' were implemented such as land reforms in favor of tenants.³⁶ Laws regarding minimum wages were enacted and to a certain degree enforced.³⁷ Furthermore, the reservation policy has been able to break the caste division of labour.³⁸

Simultaneously, a Tribal Sub-Plan to generate funding for development and joint forest management was introduced in the plateau region.³⁹ The *garibi hatao* (eradicate poverty) and 20-point welfare programmes were launched for the poor.⁴⁰ In addition, militia outfits were banned⁴¹ and a new department for tribal welfare established⁴² amongst other measures.

However, the major lacuna has been the ineffective implementation of these policies and the emergence of what has been described as 'bureaucratic feudalism'.⁴³ This has led to the privatization of public services on the one hand⁴⁴ and public awareness of the existing social conflict through failed state policies on the other⁴⁵. In rural areas, 'no single centre of power exists' as various militia groups compete for territory and influence.⁴⁶

36 Prasad, "Agrarian Unrest", 931, 933-937; Chaitanya, "Social Justice, Bihar Style", 2612; Das, "Landowners' Armies", 15+17-18; N., "Agrarian Movement", 1726-1729.

37 Prasad, "Agrarian Unrest", 931, 933-937; Chaitanya, "Social Justice, Bihar Style", 2612.

38 Sinha, "Social Mobilisation", 3287-3289.

39 Prakash, "Jharkhand".

40 Prasad, "Agrarian Unrest", 931, 933-937; Chaitanya, "Social Justice, Bihar Style", 2612; Das, "Landowners' Armies", 15+17-18; Prakash, "Jharkhand".

41 Das, "Landowners' Armies", 15+17-18.

42 Ghosh, "Ideology and Politics", 1788-1790.

43 N., D., "Agrarian Movement", 1726-1729; Sinha, "Social Mobilisation", 3287-3289.

44 Sinha and Sinha, "State, Class and 'Sena' Nexus", 2908-2912.

45 Sharma "Agrarian Relations", 960-972.

46 Singh, "Limits to Power", 3167-75.

II Bosnia and Herzegovina

2.1 Core indicators

The last census in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) took place in 1991, according to which the country counted 4,377,033 inhabitants, 43,5 percent of which were Bosnian Muslims (also referred to as Bosniaks), 31,2 percent Bosnian Serbs, 17,4 percent Bosnian Croats, and 7,9 percent belonging to other nationalities. However, the war significantly changed these numbers. With the birth and death rate at almost the same level, according to the BiH Agency for Statistics, the estimated population in June 2010 was reduced to 3,843,126.

No census has taken place since 1991, which has been repeatedly criticized by the international community and in civil society. Local politicians, however, have little appetite to enquire about ethnic issues after the conflict- but this has not been the case in civil society. The country is composed of two entities – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (51 percent of the territory), and Republika Srpska (49 percent of the territory), and the Brcko District, which is internationally supervised. It is common knowledge that most Serbs live in Republika Srpska, most Bosniaks in Bosnia, and most Croats in the Herzegovina part of the Federation. Nevertheless, this is yet to be officially confirmed by a census scheduled for 2011.

In addition to having three constitutive people (Bosniak, Serbs and Croats), BiH also has three official languages (Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian) and two alphabets (latin and cyrillic).

In economic terms, having its infrastructure almost completely demolished at the end of the war, BiH requires large-scale investment to return to its pre-conflict level of wealth. Having its national currency – the convertible mark (konvertibilna marka) – pegged to the euro has increased monetary stability. With an annual GDP per capita in 2009 at 6.246 KM, or 3.123 EUR, an unemployment rate in 2010 of 27,2 percent, high corruption rate,

39 percent of the GDP public debt, and 50 percent of the GDP allocated to government spending, BiH's economy is still far from being stable.

2.2 Conflict background

Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the six constituent republics of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Being the most multi-cultural of them all, it was also the one whose declaration of independence triggered the most destructive part of what is commonly referred to as the Yugoslav Wars. BiH's declaration of sovereignty in October 1991 was followed by a referendum for independence in early 1992. The Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats were in favour the independence, while the majority of the Bosnian Serbs opposed it, which led to the Serbian part of the population boycotting the referendum. Ultimately, the referendum was successful and BiH declared independence on March 3, 1992.

With the Yugoslav National Army, directed from Belgrade, withdrawing from the country, most of its equipment and headquarters in Bosnia fell under the control of the Army of Republika Srpska, or the Bosnian Serbs' army. Opposing the independence, the Bosnian Serb offenses in Eastern and Northern BiH began shortly after the declaration. With the Army of Republika Srpska advancing fast, Sarajevo, the capital, was besieged in April 1992, for what was to become the longest siege in the modern history of mankind.

At the same time, the Bosnian Croats, backed by Croatia, were also waging a war against the Sarajevo government. These clashes lasted until March 1994 when the Bosnian Croats and the Bosniaks formed the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Federation forces continued fighting together for the rest of the war.

Aside from the sanctions and especially the arms embargo imposed on BiH, along with several attempts by the European Union leaders to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table, there was no significant international intervention until August 1995. Namely, after many of the war atrocities being brought to the international community's attention, and especially the Srebrenica massacre in July 1995, NATO got involved by bombing Bosnian Serb positions in Bosnia. The use of force is believed to have

ultimately compelled the Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, as well as the presidents of Croatia and Serbia to start negotiating a peace agreement. The long and devastating war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was finally settled with the General Framework Agreement for Peace, commonly referred to as the Dayton Agreement, initialled at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio on 21 November 1995, and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995.

2.3 Formal and informal conflict actors

As noted above, the conflict itself had three sides. On the one side, there were the Bosnian Muslims, or rather the Bosnian Army that was defending the territory of the independent state of BiH. On the other side, there was the Army of Republika Srpska, composed of Bosnian Serbs, initially attempting to prevent the independence of BiH, and later aiming to take control over the majority Serb-populated areas and possibly contribute to the creation of 'Greater Serbia'. Finally, there was also the Bosnian Croat minority, also fighting to take control over the majority Croat-populated areas.

One indicative saying that came about in this period and accurately captures the reasons for the conflict was – “why should I be a minority in your country, when you can be a minority in mine?” Another thing that was characteristic for the Bosnian war was that it was an ‘all against all’ war, even though the percentage of mixed marriages in BiH was the highest out of all former Yugoslav republics. In addition, a poll conducted throughout Yugoslavia in the summer and fall of 1990 shows that on the questions “do you agree that every (Yugoslav) nation should have a nation state of its own?” 61 percent did not agree at all, 6 percent did not agree in part, 10 percent were undecided, 7 percent agreed to some extent and 16 percent agreed completely.

In addition to the armies, there were also many paramilitary groups and war thugs taking part in the conflict. The leaders of some of them are today celebrated as heroes in certain parts of the former Yugoslavia.

2.4 Approaches to conflict resolution; policies of regional partners

The outbreak of the Bosnian War happened in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty, and many saw it as a testing ground for the newly established EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. Feeling strongly about dealing with the problems in their immediate neighborhood and claiming that “the hour of Europe has dawned,” the Europeans were seen as the primary actor to intervene and engage in conflict resolution. At the very outbreak of the war in Yugoslavia, the EU attempted to prevent violence by imposing economic sanctions to the former federation. However, deep EU-internal divisions over the questions which party in the conflict to support and how to recognize newly independent countries once again obstructed common action on the part of the EU, undermining Brussels’ ambition to be perceived as an effective actor at the international stage.

The EU was involved in several attempts to end the war, such as the Carrington-Cutileiro Peace Plan, then together with the UN, the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, then the Owen-Stoltenberg Peace Plan. Each of these suggested a different geographical division along ethnic lines, as well as ethnic power-sharing. However, in all three instances the Bosniaks rejected the plan.

Parallel to those efforts, and aiming to limit the access to the arms, the UN Security Council in September 1991 passed a resolution imposing an arms embargo on the entire former Yugoslavia. However, with the Bosnian Serbs having inherited most of the barracks, armories and other military equipment of the Yugoslav National Army (55 percent of which were located in BiH during Yugoslavia), and the Croats being able to smuggle weapons through the coast, it was the Bosniak side that was perceived to have been hit the worst by the embargo.

On the other hand, the United States had already been calling for a more active European role in providing security in Europe, so the Yugoslav Wars, along with the American fiasco in Somalia, led to the US openly declaring not to have a dog in that fight and calling for the EU to take the lead. Nevertheless, following the active role played by international and American media, as well as various activist networks, coinciding with

the Srebrenica massacre, the US got involved in the conflict resolution efforts in the summer of 1995. Weakening the Serbian positions through a NATO operation, parallel to a reinforced diplomatic mission, along with the efforts of the multinational Contact Group, the leaders of the warring parties were brought together to Dayton, Ohio, for intense 20-day negotiations on the power-sharing Agreement that ultimately ended the bloodshed in BiH. In that sense, many perceived the US as having played an essential role in bringing the war to an end.

In the aftermath of the war, the Dayton Agreement was seen as having cemented the divisions along ethnic lines. In that sense, the general perception is that ultimately conflict resolution is impossible as long as the current constitution (also agreed upon in Dayton) remains in place. As noted above, with the exception of Sarajevo, many people live within their ethnic communities, rather than in mixed communities.

2.5 Governance

According to Annex IV of the Dayton Agreement, which is the Constitution of BiH, the country is composed of two entities — the Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serbian Republika Srpska — and Brcko District, which has a special status. The Federation is composed of ten cantons, each of which has separate political and administrative institutions. The cantons are further organized into municipalities, with the Federation having a total of 79 municipalities. Republika Srpska is organized into 62 municipalities. Additionally, the country has a three-member rotating presidency, each of the three constitutive peoples being represented by one member.

In addition to the local government structures, it is important to note the significant role played by the international community. Parallel to the signing of the Dayton Agreement, an international forum called Peace Implementation Council (PIC) was formed to oversee the implementation of the Agreement. Its Steering Board, composed of representatives from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, Presidency of the EU, European Commission and Organization of the Islamic Conference, represented by Turkey, meets three times a year and issues communiqués and recommendations. PIC appoints a senior foreign diplomat, traditionally coming from

an EU country, as the High Representative (HR). The HR is located in Sarajevo and oversees the implementation of the civilian aspects of the Agreement. As of May 1997, when the situation in the country was seen to be deteriorating, the PIC vested new powers in the HR, which came to be known as 'Bonn powers'. According to the Bonn powers the HR has the authority to dismiss officials that obstruct the implementation of aspects of the Dayton Agreement. With the HR having executive powers, the international community plays a crucial role in the governing of the Bosnian society.

In addition to the HR, the international community has been actively involved in other areas of governance as well. Following the signing of the Dayton Agreement, a NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) was in charge of the implementation of the military aspects of the Agreement. IFOR was later replaced by the NAOT Stabilization Force (SFOR), which was ultimately replaced by an EU-led EUFOR. The force has decreased significantly over the years. EUFOR nowadays is present with slightly over 2.000 troops and focuses primarily on civilian policing. Moreover, the EU has been present through what has now become the Delegation of the European Union, as well as the EU Police Mission, focusing on the police reform. Finally, it is important to note that the HR is in fact double-hatted, also acting as an EU Special Representative to the country. The organization for Security and Economic Cooperation (OSCE) is also heavily present in the country, dealing with issues such as human rights, rule of law, education reform, media, civil society, and security cooperation. The UN is also present with several agencies. For instance, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has taken the lead regarding refugees and the many internally displaced persons following the war. The UN Development Program (UNDP), on the other hand, is actively engaged in the reconstruction of the country. Additionally, the World Bank has focused its efforts in BiH on its economic reconstruction.

The international non-governmental organizations have also been very active in BiH. For instance, the International Committee of the Red Cross has been dealing with missing persons.

Finally, significant amounts of international aid and donations have been spent on projects concerning BiH civil society. However, local NGOs are still to a large degree perceived by the population as irrelevant in the policy process. Governance at the national, entity, and regional level is also perceived to be deadlocked, over increasingly overt nationalism and an inability to engage more closely with EU reforms.

III Cyprus

3.1 Background of the conflict

After independence in 1960, and since the mid 1950s Cyprus has been an arena for conflict, fusing the effects of international politics with regional and local tensions. In December 1963 fighting erupted between Greek and Turkish Cypriots (representing 78% and 18% of the island's population respectively) over President (Archbishop) Makarios's constitutional reform proposal (the '13 Points'), which intended to curb legal privileges of the Turkish Cypriots and possibly to create a unitary state dominated by the Greek Cypriot majority which could then unite with Greece. While this incident triggered the subsequent hostilities, the root causes of Cyprus's intercommunal violence can be traced back to a combination of factors such as identity mobilization along ethnic lines, institutionalised practices of Ottoman and British colonial rule, Greek independence, the power vacuum left after decolonization as well as increasing tensions between Greece and Turkey.⁴⁷

Four months later the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was deployed to the island on the grounds that unrest threatened the stability of NATO. The UN Security Council Resolution recognised the Greek Cypriot President as its key interlocutor and marginalised the Turkish Cypriot side in terms of the control of the formal sovereignty of the island, with significant ramifications for Turkish Cypriot nationalism and Turkish policy towards Greece and Cyprus. UNFICYP struggled to contain the violence that broke out amongst what were then ethnically mixed communities. The Greek Cypriot President moved quickly to consolidate Greek Cypriot control of political institutions and the Turkish Cypriot community moved into enclaves representing around 3% of the island.

47 Richmond, Oliver P., "Decolonisation and post-independence causes of conflict: The case of Cyprus", *Civil Wars*, 5 (2002): 171- 178; Chaim Kaufmann, "An Assessment of the Partition of Cyprus", *International Studies Perspectives*, 8 (2007): 209 -212 / 206 – 223; Maria Hadjipavlou, "The Cyprus Conflict: Root Causes and Implications for Peacebuilding", *Journal of Peace Research*, 44 (2007): 349 -365: See also Oliver P Richmond, *Mediating in Cyprus*, London: Frank Cass, 1998.

Several rounds of failed talks were held under the auspices of UN mediation and good offices were held after 1964 before Turkish troops invaded (or 'intervened', depending on whether Turkish military action is deemed a legitimate response to violence directed at Turkish Cypriots or not) the island after a Greek junta backed coup d'état in 1974 against President Makarios. This led to a hardening of the partition of the island and a rapid ethnic 'unmixing' between the Greek south and the Turkish north, divided by the so-called Green Line. Soon after the Turkish Cypriot community, now controlling courtsey of 40,000 Turkish troops, 39% of the island in the north declared a 'federated state' in preparation for their desired federal solution which would recognised their new territorial continuity. In 1983 the Turkish Cypriot part of the island, under the nationalist leader Rauf Denktash, declared itself the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'. Lacking wider international recognition,⁴⁸ this declaration of statehood has yet to translate into legal sovereignty though.

The creeping homogenisation of village communities⁴⁹ followed by the displacement of at least 210,000⁵⁰ in 1974 Cypriots mainly through the partition of the island, unintentionally reinforced by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) have divided Cyprus into two ethnically homogenous communities. As a consequence Cyprus has experienced a negative peace since 1974. Despite their effectiveness in keeping violence at bay,⁵¹ these segregation measures have contributed nothing to achieve a positive peace and may have even obstructed conflict resolution.⁵² They have reinforced the general control of political institutions by nationalist elements on both sides of the Green Line for much of the post-independence period.

48 Only Turkey has so far recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

49 According to Lindley aggravating distrust between Greek and Turkish Cypriots led to increasingly homogenous settlement patterns: The percentage of ethnically mixed villages decreased from 43 percent in 1891 to 10 percent in 1970 (Lindley, Dan, Historical, Tactical and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of Cyprus, *International Studies Perspectives*, 8 (2007): 231.

50 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, "Cyprus", www.internal-displacement.org

51 Lindley, "Lessens from the Partition", 233 – 236; Kaufmann, "Assessment of the Partition", 21 / 22.

52 Oliver Richmond, "Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in Cyprus", *The Cyprus Review*, 6 (1994): 29 – 32.

Hence, while the conflict cooled down in terms of violence after 1974, no breakthrough has been achieved throughout decades of UN-led mediation attempts. Both sides have been reluctant to compromise on their long-standing goals (a relatively or completely separate state for Turkish Cypriots and a removal of Turkish troops, settlers, the return of property, and control of most or all sovereignty for Greek Cypriots). From 1974 to 2003 several completely inconclusive rounds of talks were held between the international recognised government of the Republic of Cyprus (meaning Greek Cypriots) and the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot side (and their unrecognised state). However, the general form of a settlement did emerge.

This deadlock appeared to be broken when the Greek Cypriot side was successful in joining the EU, completely with derogations for the occupied north of the island, following swiftly on from the opening of the Green Line to local traffic. The UN Secretary General's 'Annan Plan' was put to a referendum to both sides just before Cyprus' formal entry to the EU, and was accepted by Turkish Cypriots but rejected by a majority of Greek Cypriots in 2004. Since, then however, deadlock has returned though talks have continued, making glacial, if any progress. Currently, there are seven main issues awaiting a diplomatic solution: governance and power sharing, compensation for property appropriated during the conflict, external representation of a future federation, economic integration, borders, security and issues of citizenship.⁵³

On 21 March 2008 the Greek Cypriot leader Demetris Christofias and his Turkish Cypriot counterpart Mehmet Ali Talat embarked on a series of talks to resolve those issues and open new avenues for conflict resolution after the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriots. The talks were structured around six negotiation areas (governance and power-sharing, EU matters, economics, property, territory, security and guarantees) and brought about tangible progress in some of those areas⁵⁴: new crossing points were opened in the heart of Nicosia's old town; the parties decided on May 23 2008 that the a Cypriot federation would have two 'constituent states' and a 'single

53 For more information: see International Crisis Group, "Reunification or Partition?", 15-21.

54 See: International Crisis Group, "Cyprus: Six Steps Towards a Settlement", Policy Briefing, Europe Briefing No. 61 (22 February 2011): 3, www.crisisgroup.org

international personality'; on July 1 Talat and Christofias agreed on the principle of single citizenship; moreover, 22 classifications of disputed property were approved. Due to the recent nationalistic shift in the Turkish Cypriot leadership after the 2010 elections and the informal format of the talks though, the sustainability of this tentative progress may depend on the influence of Turkey, Greece and the EU on the conflict parties.

3.2 Core indicators of economic development

Cyprus is home to 1,102,677 inhabitants, 274,436 of which live in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.⁵⁵ The conflict produced 210,000 internally displaced people, whose properties are still a major bone of contention.

The island's ethnic mix consists of 78 percent Greek Catholics, 18 percent Muslims, and the remaining four percent encompassing Maronite, Roman Catholic, Armenian Orthodox.⁵⁶ As mentioned above, after violence broke out, Cypriot towns and villages would be either Greek orthodox or Muslim due to distrust induced settlement patterns on the island.⁵⁷

Cyprus's economic growth in 2010 was 1.7 percent, with a GDP of US\$ 24.7 billion generated by the Republic of Cyprus⁵⁸ compared to US\$ 3.2 billion in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus⁵⁹. While the large discrepancy is somewhat mitigated by the demographic gap between the south and the north, the TRNC still only generates half of the south's GDP in per capita figures, and is very dependent on a significant annual subvention from Turkey. The low growth rate shows that international economic developments such as the global recession significantly affect the Cypriot economy. In September 2010, the IMF

55 CIA Publications: World Factbook, "Cyprus" <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/cy.html#Econ>

US Department of State: "Background Notes – Cyprus" <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5376.htm>

56 US Department of State: "Background Notes – Cyprus" <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5376.htm>

57 Lindley, "Tactical and Strategic Lessons", 231.

58 US Department of State: "Background Notes – Cyprus" <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5376.htm>

59 TRNC State Planning Organization <http://www.devplan.org/Frame-eng.html>

warned of a potential banking crisis due to the seize and concentration of the Cypriot banking sector.⁶⁰ In terms of dominant economic sectors the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus show similar a profile with services and tourism constituting the main sectors of the economy in both cases, complemented by manufacturing in the Greek south and agriculture in the Turkish north.⁶¹

While the Cyprus conflict is not in essence an economic conflict fought over the distribution of resources or the economic marginalization of one ethnic group, conflict resolution will require dealing with certain economic issues: questions of compensation for the appropriation of property by both parties during and after the hostilities will need to be resolved.⁶² Moreover, trade or even wider economic integration could prove useful for a sustainable peace, especially if the free movement of people is concerned.

3.3 Formal and informal conflict actors and agendas

Greek Cypriots

Demetris Christofias, the leader of the Greek Cypriots, has demonstrated some willingness to compromise in the talks with his previous counterpart Mehmet Ali Talat. Christofias offered for instance that the presidency of a future federation could rotate between the members and he pledged to grant citizenship to 50,000 ‘settlers’ or immigrants from the Turkish north, long part of the demands of the Turkish Cypriot leadership.⁶³ In other aspects of the peace talks, the Greek Cypriots are considered

60 International Monetary Fund, “Cyprus: Selected Issues”, Washington DC, (10 September 2010): 2-8, <http://www.imf.org>.

61 CIA Publications: World Factbook, ‘Cyprus’ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/cy.html#Econ>

62 International Crisis Group, “Cyprus: Bridging the Property Divide”, Europe Report No. 210, 9 December 2010, www.crisisgroup.org.

63 International Crisis Group, “Cyprus: Six Steps”, 3.

‘complacent’ and ‘dragging their feet’⁶⁴ though, possibly due to the constraints posed by nationalist Greek Cypriot politicians and media.⁶⁵

Within the framework of the EU, however, the Republic of Cyprus has sought to keep up the pressure on northern Cyprus and its mainland backer Turkey. As a new member state, the Republic of Cyprus has used its influence to lobby against EU integration with northern Cyprus and to block the progress on Turkey’s accession negotiations.⁶⁶ Due to the success of this strategy, scholars have coined the term ‘Cypriotization’ of EU policies to describe how the Republic of Cyprus has turned into a ‘single issue’ member state, successfully using its limited impact on EU decision-making to advance its interests with regard to the Cyprus conflict.⁶⁷

Turkish Cypriots

In April 2010 the Turkish Cypriots elected the 72-years old veteran nationalist Dervis Eroglu as their new president. Eroglu was elected on a platform committed to “two separate sovereign people in separate areas” and to revisiting every concession his predecessor Mehmet Ali Talat had made in previous peace talks.⁶⁸ The formula that ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ implies that progress achieved by the Talat-Christofias talks remains open to contestation by the new Turkish Cypriot leadership.⁶⁹ Having spent most of his political career on shaping the TRNC, Eroglu is expected to strongly oppose significant concessions on northern Cyprus’s independence.

Worse still, Eroglu’s election reflects a wider trend of disillusionment within the Turkish Cypriot community: disappointed by the EU’s decision to allow the unconditional

64 International Crisis Group, “Cyprus: Reunification or Partition?”, Europe Report No. 201, 30 September 2009, www.crisisgroup.org

65 International Crisis Group, “Cyprus: Six Steps”, 3.

66 Eight chapters in Turkey’s accession negotiation are permanently blocked by Republic of Cyprus until a resolution to the Cyprus conflict is found.

67 Thomas Diez and Nathalie Tocci, “The Cyprus Conflict and the Ambiguous Effect of Europeanization”, *The Cyprus Review*, 22:2 (2010), 175 – 186.

68 Hugh Pope, “Solving the EU-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle”, International Crisis Group, 23 April 2010, www.crisisgroup.org.

69 International Crisis Group, “Cyprus: Six Steps”, 3.

accession of the Greek south and failure to facilitate trade and development in the north, while Turkish accession negotiations have slowed down, many Turkish Cypriots have written off Europe as a potential catalyst for conflict resolution.⁷⁰

Greece

Despite its history of intervention and engagement in the Cyprus conflict, Greece has downgraded its role to ‘providing moral support’ for the government of the Republic of Cyprus since 2004.⁷¹ With respect to its stance on the Cyprus conflict, Greece is characterized by some analysts as a case, in which Europeanization has led to a substantial change of foreign policies. According to Oenis and Yilmaz, Greece—specifically during George Papandreou's terms in office ‘has been converted from a negative veto power to a country that increasingly realizes that it could achieve its national objectives through a process of dialogue with Turkey and most important of all by promoting Turkey’s quest for full EU membership.’⁷² Another reason why the government of Greece may have decided to stand on the sidelines in recent years could be easing of Greece’s historic guilt for the 1974 coup after the EU accession of the Republic of Cyprus.⁷³

Turkey

Turkey is the TRNC’s main trading partner, supplying 68% of its imports and absorbing around 58% of exports. Additionally, Ankara finances about one third of TRNC’s budget.⁷⁴ This strong economic dependence on the motherland and the pro-negotiation stance of the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan are expected to keep Eroglu’s nationalistic politics at bay.⁷⁵ Moreover, Erdogan supported the Annan Plan in

70 Diez and Tocci, “The Cyprus Conflict”, 183.

71 International Crisis Group, “Reunification or Partition?”, 26.

72 Ziya Oenis and Suhnaz Yilmaz, “Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: Rhetoric or Reality?” *Political Science Quarterly*, 123: 1 (2008): 136.

73 International Crisis Group, “Reunification or Partition?”, 26.

74 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Cyprus”, *World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cy.html#Econ>

75 Pope, “The EU-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle”.

2004 and helped to open the Green Line in Cyprus to facilitate the freedom of movement between the Greek south and the Turkish north of Cyprus. This supportive position towards intercommunal reconciliation and conflict resolution in Cyprus can largely be attributed to the EU's strategy of linking Turkey's accession negotiations with a resolution of the Cyprus conflict.⁷⁶ The European Council's decision at the Helsinki Summit in 1999 to grant Turkey candidate status and to open formal accession negotiations provided ample inducement for Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government to promote Cyprus's peace process.

3.4 Approaches to conflict resolution: policies of external actors

The EU

The EU's attempt to incentivize conflict resolution by offering EU accession in exchange for the acceptance of the Annan Plan ultimately failed. The European Commission continued to assume the decision, taken at the Helsinki summit in December 1999, that Cyprus' accession would not be conditional on a settlement would be an incentive for a settlement coinciding with EU accession. Despite an overwhelming acceptance in the Turkish north the plan fell short of gathering sufficient approval in the Republic of Cyprus, after a powerful 'no' campaign by its nationalist president, Tassos Papadopoulos. After an effective lobbying campaign by the Greek Cypriots, the EU decided to admit the Republic of Cyprus, rendering the TRNC isolated. Through the eyes of most Turkish Cypriots, however, this development revealed an EU bias towards the interests of the Republic of Cyprus: first, the EU rewarded the Greek Cypriots with full EU membership despite their rejection of the Annan peace plan in 2004, while the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as the party willing to make peace along the lines of the Annan Plan remains excluded from the *acquis communautaire* and the access to the internal market.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Oenis and Yilmaz, "Greek-Turkish Rapprochement", 136.

⁷⁷ For an explanation of the European Council to admit the Republic of Cyprus without the condition regarding a settlement of the conflict, see Saskia Ramming, "Cyprus's Accession Negotiations to the European Union: Conditional Carrots, Good Faith and Miscalculations", *International Negotiations*, 13 (2008): 365-386.

Moreover, the Republic of Cyprus managed to block a European Commission proposal for economic integration with the TRNC.

Hence, a 'Europeanization' of the Republic of Cyprus's politics, significantly altering Greek Cypriots' attitudes towards Turkey or the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, has not set in.⁷⁸ On the contrary though, successful Greek Cypriot lobbying has created an anti-Turkey coalition Brussels and polarized EU decision-making towards Turkey's membership as well as with regard to a possible political and economic rapprochement with northern Cyprus.⁷⁹

The UN

Since deploying UN peacekeeping forces (UNFICYP) to Cyprus, 'the UN has been the only actor to stay fully engaged with the Cyprus problem since 1964'.⁸⁰ In the absence of violence between the two communities, the mission has been drawn down over time to now 850 soldiers and 60 police officers.⁸¹ Moreover, the UN provides diplomatic support to the conflict parties in the forms of shuttle diplomacy conducted by Alexander Downer, the Secretary-General's special adviser for Cyprus. Due to the long-term involvement of its good offices in the Cyprus conflict, the UN is seen as the only legitimate mediator between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. With the current peace talks floundering, Greek Cypriots demanding a 'Cypriot solution' to the conflict and UN peacekeeping resources being in high demand in more dangerous places, however, there is ample discussion about ending the UN's longest-running mission.⁸²

Hence, all four main parties and influential external actors such as the EU and the UN have historically contributed to the impasse that the current peace talks have reached: The two Cypriot communities are to blame for their role in the violence between 1963 and

78 Diez and Tocci, "The Cyprus Conflict", 181.

79 Diez and Tocci, "The Cyprus Conflict", 181.

80 Oliver Richmond, Shared sovereignty and the politics of peace: evaluating the EU's catalytic framework in the eastern Mediterranean, *International Affairs*, 82:1 (2005): 157.

81 International Crisis Group, "Cyprus: Six Steps", 4.

82 International Crisis Group, "Reunification or Partition?", 31.

1974, which reinforced intercommunal distrust; the Greek Cypriots additionally blocked the Annan Plan in 2004; the Turkish Cypriots are responsible for their uncompromising politics between 1974 and 2003; Turkey and Greece bear their respective responsibility in the invasion and the coup in 1974; the EU allowed a divided Cyprus to join the Union; and the UN helps perpetuating the frozen conflict by reinforcing the division of the communities and failing to find a plausible mediation strategy.

3.5 Governance approaches to conflict resolution

In contrast to the other case studies in the project, Cyprus's separation of the two feuding communities into ethnically homogenous and geographically distinct entities poses a very different set of challenges in the area of governance. In post-conflict polities, where the former enemies have to deal with the same institutions, accept the decisions of the same parliament and trust the protection of the same security forces, checks and balances or power-sharing arrangements are needed at every level of societal order. While the geographical and political separation of the two states of Cyprus facilitates people's everyday life after the hostilities, it delays the process of inter-communal confidence-building.

Seeking reconciliation and conflict settlement in Cyprus requires institutions of shared or at least mutually accepted governance. Hence, in the governance part of this project we will analyse institutions like the *Turkish Cypriot Immovable Property Commission*, which set out to solve conflicting property claims mainly resulting from the Turkish occupation. Another initiative would be UNDP's *Action for Co-operation and Trust*, aiming to foster good relations between the two state entities.

Moreover, in terms of civil society initiatives, we will look into the work of the *Cyprus Network for Youth Development* which prepares youth and teachers to play an active role in the reconciliation process, *Technology For Peace (TFP)* which uses information technology to provide a body of material and knowledge relevant to the peace efforts in Cyprus and the *Cypriot Civil Society Strengthening Programme (CCSSP)*⁸³ supported by

83 <http://www.intrac.org/pages/en/cyprus.html>

UNDP-ACT between the years 2006 and 2008 which organized dialoguing events on a range of critical issues facing Cyprus civil society and has now launched its second phase to promote inter-communal tolerance and mutual understanding.⁸⁴ Since its founding in 2001, the non-governmental Cypriot women's organization '*Hands Across the Divide*' (HAD) has been working on women's role in peace and looking at conflict through a gender lens aspiring to a reunited, democratic Cyprus with gender equality, inclusion of women's views on security, militarism and violence and multicultural, multilingual schools.⁸⁵

84 <http://www.undp-act.org/default.aspx?tabid=117&it=0&mid=0&itemid=0&langid=1>

85 Cypriot Women's Initiatives and Interventions for Peace and Gender Equality <http://www.handsacrossthedivide.org/node/74>

IV Georgia

4.1 Background of the conflict

Since Georgia obtained independence from Soviet rule on 9 April 1991, the country has been afflicted by political instability and, especially, violent conflict over the two autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As ethnic and religious minorities within Georgia, the Abkhaz and South Ossetians – unlike the rest of Georgia – have struggled for decades to defend their political autonomy.⁸⁶ In the early 1990s, both regions sought secession from Georgia. As a result, violent hostilities broke out between separatist rebels and Georgia's armed forces ending with two ceasefire agreements in 1992 and 1994. However, tensions persisted in the region, which led to the establishment of a UN observer mission in August 1993 (UNOMIG), and an increased involvement of Russia, the OSCE and the European Union. The wars caused some 9,000 deaths and more than 250,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs).⁸⁷

With the election of Mikheil Saakashvili to the presidency in 2004, shortly after the rose revolution, reunification became a priority for the Georgian state.⁸⁸ In addition, Saakashvili was determined to move Georgia closer to the EU and NATO, and frequently accused Russia of supporting the rebels fighting for independence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. At the same time, Russian officials accused the Georgian government of hiding North Caucasian insurgents operating against Russia.⁸⁹ This seriously worsened the increasingly strained relations and aggressive rhetoric between the two countries.⁹⁰

86 Housman A. Sadri and Nathan L. Burns, *Caucasian Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 4 (Spring 2010): 136-138.

87 International Crisis Group, "Abkhazia Today", Europe Report N°176, 15 September 2006; International Crisis Group, "Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia, Europe Report N°159, 26 November 2004.

88 Housman A. Sadri and Nathan L. Burns, *Caucasian Review*, 136-138.

89 International Crisis Group, "Georgia's Conflict History", 2008

90 Aphrasidze David and David Siroky, "Frozen transitions and unfrozen conflicts, or what went wrong in Georgia", *Yale Journal of International Affairs*, Summer 2010.

Throughout 2005-2006, there were numerous reports of violence between Georgian armed forces and separatists in Abkhazia and parts of South Ossetia.

The situation deteriorated when Georgia's armed forces clashed with rebels in the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali on August 7, 2008. This was followed on 8 August, by a heavy Russian counter-offensive that triggered a period of violence also including parts of Abkhazia. On 12 August, the Russian government unilaterally declared an end of operations. Facilitated by France acting on behalf of the EU, the parties agreed on a six point-peace plan. The plan called on all parties to cease hostilities and move back armed forces to their pre 8 August positions. Despite the end of hostilities, tensions remain high. On 25 August 2008, Russia recognized Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's independence,⁹¹ although their international status remains unsettled.⁹²

4.2 Core indicators of economic development

In 2010 the Georgian population stood at 4,600,825. According to the last census (2002), Georgia's ethnic mix (excluding Abkhazia and South Ossetia) encompasses 83.8% Georgians, 6.5 % Azeris, 5.7% Armenians 1.5% Russians and 2.5% others.⁹³ According to the Crisis Group (ICG), the current population of Abkhazia is approximately 180,000-220,000 individuals, of which less than 100,000 are ethnic Abkhaz. Other ethnic groups living in Abkhazia are: Armenians (44,800), Russians (23,500) and Georgians (43,600).⁹⁴ The population in South Ossetia is around 30,000. No information is available regarding their ethnic composition since the August 2008 war.⁹⁵

91 Jim Nichol, "Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and implications for U.S. Interests", CRS Report for the Congress, Washington DC, 29 August 2008.

92 International Crisis Group, "Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence", Europe Report No 202, February 2010.

93 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), "Georgia", The World Factbook: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html>.

94 As the sources, the ICG cites the census of 2003 reported by the Apsnypress and UN diplomats. See: International crisis Group (ICG), "Deepening Dependence", 26 February 2010.

95 International Crisis Group, "South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition", Europe Report N°205 – 7 June 2010.

Since the Rose Revolution, Georgia has enjoyed impressive economic development mostly due to a wide range of reforms. In 2010, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at current prices amounted to USD 1,216,0 million (GDP per capita USD 661.4). Real GDP growth in 2010 was 6.7%. Industry (18%) makes up the largest share in the sectoral structure of GDP, followed by services (16%), public administration and infrastructure and communication (12%), agriculture, forestry and fishing (8%) and construction (7%).⁹⁶ In the same year, Georgia's foreign trade turnover amounted to USD 6.678.5m, marking a 21% increase compared to 2009. Georgia's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2010 reached USD160.4m. In order to attract FDI Saakashvili's government simplified the tax code, improved tax administration and tax enforcement, and reduced the level of corruption. Despite these economic reforms however, poverty remains a main challenge with 55% of the population subsisting on incomes below the national poverty line.⁹⁷

Georgia imports nearly all its natural gas, oil products and energy, despite having sizeable hydropower capacity. However, the country has overcome its chronic energy shortages and gas supply interruptions by renovating hydropower plants and diversifying natural gas imports by purchasing energy resources from Azerbaijan and Iran, instead of from Russia. Through the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, and the Tbilisi-Kars-Akhalkalaki Railroad, the Georgian government tried to consolidate its image as strategic transit country of Caspian natural resources towards Western markets.

In stark contrast, the economic and social development of Abkhazia and South Ossetia largely depends on Russia. Nearly 60% of the Abkhaz state budget is financed by the Kremlin. Moscow covers all the expenses for the reconstruction of infrastructure as well as local pensions.⁹⁸ Furthermore, Russia is the largest trade partner for Abkhazia. Tourism remains one of the main sources of income. Like Abkhazia, Russia is also the main

96 The GDP of 2009 at current prices was US\$ 2,739.8 (per capita: US\$ 624,7). See Gross Domestic Product of Georgia in Q3 2010, National Statistics Office of Georgia, http://www.geostat.ge/cms/site_images/files/english/nad/GDP_2010Q3_Eng.pdf.

97 World Bank, "Georgia at a glance", http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/geo_aag.pdf.

98 Abkhaz opposition fear growing Russian influence, Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), 7 August 2009.

contributor to South Ossetia's local budget. There is no reliable information on other main economic indicators of the *de facto* republics. The main source of income for a large part of the population in these regions is based on small-scale trade.

4.3 Formal and informal conflict actors and agendas

Georgia

Georgia, with its conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, represents an archetypal case of an intra- and inter-state conflict with critical implications for the wider European region. Beyond its intra-state conflicts, Georgia is embroiled in inter-state conflict dynamics, including the conflict between Georgia and Russia and the broader tension between Russia, the EU and the US in the former Soviet space.

After the August 2008 war, Georgia reversed its established policy of isolation towards the breakaway regions and drafted a new State Strategy on Occupied Territories. Engagement, rather than isolation, is the new strategy of the Georgian government to achieve the full de-occupation and integration of the lost territories. Promoting economic interaction between the parties, improving socio-economic conditions and health care in the conflict affected regions, rehabilitating infrastructure, promoting human rights and inter-communal projects are identified as the main tools for successful conflict resolution. In the framework of this strategy, the Georgian government has developed an Action Plan, which establishes a status-neutral liaison mechanism in order to facilitate the engagement of the Georgian authorities with the Abkhaz and South Ossetian counterparts. Furthermore, the Action Plan proposes a Neutral Identification Card and Travel Document in order to promote the freedom of movement for the residents of the conflict zones; a joint investment fund and cooperation agency; a financial institution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that would guarantee cash transfers and other legal transactions; a trust fund in charge of fundraising for economic and social projects; and finally integrated socio-economic zones in areas straddling the *de facto* borders.⁹⁹ Furthermore, Saakashvili pledged officially that Georgia does not intend to re-gain lost territories by military means and signed a unilateral declaration on the non-use of force.

⁹⁹ Government of Georgia, "State Strategy on Occupied Territories: Engagement Through Cooperation", January 2010.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia

Abkhazia and South Ossetia have expressed little interest in these Georgian initiatives, however. Generally, they view reconciliation from an opposite perspective. For both, the conflicts have been resolved. They gained their independence and do not need to elaborate strategies for conflict resolution. Abkhazia's only goal could be to consolidate its sovereignty and strengthen its economic relations with Russia. In the case of South Ossetia on the other hand, the authorities seem to be rather focused on integration with North Ossetia and thus into the Russian Federation.

Russia

After the August 2008 war and the ensuing Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Kremlin increased its presence there. Moscow has signed friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance treaties with Georgia's breakaway regions. Moscow is now set to keep 7,600 soldiers in these regions, more than twice the number present before the war.¹⁰⁰ Additionally, in May 2009, the Kremlin signed a border protection agreement with Sokhumi, establishing 800 Russian troops in Abkhazia. The agreement was followed by a military cooperation agreement allowing Moscow to access the military airbase at Gudauta and the naval base at Ochamchire for 49 years.¹⁰¹ Also South Ossetia signed an agreement with Russia on establishing a Russian border patrol. Furthermore, Moscow was allowed to construct a new military base in Tskhinvali. Interfax reported recently that Russia has deployed short-range ballistic missiles, Tochka-U (SS-21 Scarab B) and other offensive weapons in South Ossetia.¹⁰² Russia controls South Ossetia's and Abkhazia's leadership and all strategically important government and security sector appointments. Abkhazia intends to grant Russia the control of its railway

100 RadioFreeEurope, "EU Hurries to Deploy Beefed-Up Georgia Mission," RadioLiberty, 22 September 2008, www.rferl.org.

101 Alexander Cooley and Lincoln A. Mitchell "Engagement without Recognition: A New Strategy toward Abkhazia and Eurasia's Unrecognized States", *The Washington Quarterly*, 33 (2010): 59-73.

102 Tbilisi condemns deployment of Tocka-U in S.Ossetia, *Civil Georgia*, Tbilisi, 24 January 2011, www.civil.ge.

and airport, and licence to Russia's state-owned oil company Rosneft oil exploration rights in the Black Sea. The absolute majority of Abkhazs and South Ossetians hold Russian passports and receive social subsidies from the Russian federation.

4.4 Approaches to conflict resolution: policies of external and regional actors

The US

External actors have different levels of engagement with the political and economic development of this region. To date, the policies of two important players in the region – the US and EU, which together with the OSCE and the UN are engaged in conflict mediation in the framework of Geneva Talks – have remained controversial and ineffective. The US has an interest in access to Central Asia and the Middle East through the Caspian states; the region's transport system provides an essential supply link for NATO to the heartland of Eurasia, including Afghanistan. Furthermore, the crisis with Iran places the region at the centre of US strategic interests. Hence, the US's presence in military and energy security terms was welcomed by states such as Georgia, while simultaneously fanning the flames of great power politics in the region.

The EU

Compared to the US, EU policies have been more low-key and less controversial. Yet they are widely viewed as ineffective. EU policies have been centred on the provision of aid to the region (first under the framework of TACIS, now under the ENPI financial instrument). In the field of conflict resolution, little has been done both in terms of mediation and the EU-Russia dialogue, even if conflict settlement was declared as one of the main priorities of the European Neighbourhood policy (ENP). The Union has tried to promote peace indirectly through its democracy and good governance programmes as well as its regional cooperation initiatives (first TRACECA, now the Black Sea Synergy), but has not engendered tangible results. Finally, the differences in strategic outlooks both within the EU and between the EU and the US have also complicated the search for

consensus on the future role and tasks of NATO in the South Caucasus, as demonstrated at the Bucharest summit in April 2008.¹⁰³

Turkey

Since the early 1990s, Turkey has been an important security, economic and political actor in the Caucasus and Black Sea regions. In the midst of the divisive energy politics of the region, Turkey plays a complex balancing act: on the one hand, improving its relations with Russia and maintaining good ties with Iran, and on the other hand, supporting East-West corridor routes such as the BTC, BTE and Nabucco pipelines. By promoting different energy projects and developing bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the fields of transport, business and communication as well as by actively participating in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Turkey has also played a political role in the region. Most pointedly, in the aftermath of the Georgian-Russian war Turkey launched a proposal for a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Pact (CSCP), which may be revamped in light of Turkey's protocol agreement for the normalization of relations with Armenia signed on 10 October 2009. The CSCP aims to bring together all three South Caucasus countries, as well as Turkey and Russia and thus to create a new regional security framework. Ethnic conflicts would be resolved on the basis of regional cooperation. Since its proposal in 2008 however, the plan remains on paper and no tangible steps have been taken towards its implementation.

4.5 Governance and Institutions

Georgia

As defined by its constitution, Georgia is governed at national, regional and local levels and is divided in three Autonomous Republics: two of them – Abkhazia and South Ossetia – are breakaway regions remaining beyond the control of the central government in Tbilisi, whereas the third Autonomous Republic of Adjara was successfully reintegrated into the country after the revolution in May 2004. The head of Adjara is

103 At the Bucharest summit the NATO prospects of Ukraine and Georgia were indefinitely put on hold.

appointed by the Georgian President and approved by the autonomous regional parliament. At the local level, government consists of 64 municipalities and 5 self-governing cities including Tbilisi. The regions are governed by presidential appointees, rendering their autonomy circumscribed by the state government.

Georgia is not a perfectly functioning democracy. The shortcomings were identified by OSCE monitors in all elections held since the 2003 Rose revolution, even if those elections were considered in compliance with international standards. Until the 2008 elections, the Georgian parliament consisted of 235 members, the majority of which was elected by party lists, 75 – in single-member districts, and 10 represented IDPs from Abkhazia. Following the 2008 constitutional reform, the parliament was reduced to 150 members. Half of its members are now elected through party lists, while the other half is chosen in single-member districts. Saakashvili's National Movement has an absolute majority in parliament. The parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition are rather fragmented, non-aligned and incapable of formulating a coherent and alternative governance programme that could challenge the ruling party.

In 2010, the Georgian parliament passed further amendments to the constitution, which reduced the powers of the next president in favour of the prime minister and the government. Today, most political power remains concentrated in the hands of the President. The Venice Commission stated that the amendments “provide for several important improvements and significant steps in the right direction. [However] it would be desirable to further strengthen the powers of parliament.”¹⁰⁴

Since the Rose revolution, Saakashvili's government has adopted a liberal economic policy and launched an economic liberalization process in order to simplify business procedures. According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the World Bank and International Financial Transparency International, Georgia ranks top in this regard in the post-Soviet space.¹⁰⁵ Despite wide-ranging reforms reducing the level of corruption, this remains one of the main challenges for Saakashvili's

104 European Commission For Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), “Final Opinion on the Draft Constitutional Law on Amendments and Changes to the Constitution of Georgia,” Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 84th Plenary Session, Venice, 15-16 October 2010, <http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2010/CDL-AD%282010%29028-e.asp>.

105 The World Bank, “Georgia: Country Brief”, 2010, www.worldbank.org

government. However, most fundamental was the reform of the police and education systems, in which bribery was widespread.

As for freedom of the media, despite being guaranteed by the constitution, since the Rose revolution, the media has become increasingly pro-government. Furthermore, there is a lack of transparency with regard to shares in TV stations, raising doubts about these stations' independence.¹⁰⁶ However, in 2010, the president proposed to include opposition-supported candidates in the public broadcaster's board of trustees.

After the police brutally cracked down on demonstrators in November 2007, when Saakashvili's government became subject of mass criticism by the international community, freedom of assembly has improved significantly. Also the rights of ethnic minorities (within Georgian-controlled territory) are generally respected. However, their political participation is low. In order to foster the integration of ethnic minorities (mostly Azeris and Armenians), the government adopted a "Concept on Tolerance and Civil Integration". Generally, human rights violations in prisons exist, as reported by the state ombudsman. Furthermore, some opposition groups have claimed the existence of political prisoners.¹⁰⁷

Civil society in Georgia was most vibrant prior to the Rose revolution. Thereafter, many civil society representatives moved into the public sector. This in turn caused a vacuum of professional human capital in the third sector. Additionally, foreign funds for civil society have diminished, whereas local funding was always limited. However, by newly established and state-sponsored Civic Institutionalization Development Fund of Georgia has begun to provide small grants in order to finance civic activities.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, there are no restraints for fundraising by CSOs and grants are free from taxation.

Abkhazia

The de facto constitution of Abkhazia establishes a presidential-parliamentary system, with the president and vice-president elected for a five-year term. The parliament (People's Assembly) is formed by 35 members elected for five years from single-seat

106 Freedom House, "Nations in Transit: Georgia", 2010, www.freedomhouse.org

107 Freedom House, "Georgia", Freedom in the World, www.freedomhouse.org

108 Freedom House, "Nations in Transit", www.freedomhouse.org

constituencies. Corruption is widespread among political elites, however there is no official data on corruption. The mass media is partly controlled by the state; privately owned newspapers suffer from pressure by the authorities. One private TV station was denied a broadcast licence and a journalist was sentenced to three years in prison in 2009. Also religious freedom is under question in Abkhazia. In 2009, three Georgian Orthodox priests together with some monks and nuns were expelled from the Kodori Gorge.¹⁰⁹ In general, Georgians in Gali are required to renounce their Georgian citizenship; access to Georgian-language education is restricted and Georgian language was replaced by Russian.¹¹⁰ Georgians are denied from studying at the Sokhumi State University as well. In contrast with these shortcomings in human rights and freedoms, civil society in Abkhazia is extremely vibrant and manages to exercise relative influence on government policy-making.

South Ossetia

South Ossetia is governed by a president together with a 33-seat parliament elected for a five-year term. After the August 2008 war, the current President Eduard Kokoity dismissed his cabinet of ministers and replaced most of them with Russian officials. Vadim Brovtsev, a Russian businessman, was appointed as prime minister. Corruption is believed to be widespread. Even Russian funds for post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation were in practice channelled to South Ossetian political elites. Moscow itself admits that only an insignificant part of aid to Tskhinvali has actually been appropriately spent. The South Ossetian economy is based on smuggling and black-market activities. The mass media is completely under government control and CSOs are co-opted by the officials.¹¹¹

109 Freedom House, "Abkhazia", Freedom in the World, 2010, www.freedomhouse.org.

110 Human Rights Watch, "Georgians in Gali", February 19, 2011, www.hrw.org.

111 Freedom House, "South Ossetia", Freedom in the World, 2010, www.freedomhouse.org.

V Kashmir

5.1 Core indicators

With its extraordinary medley of races, tribal groups, languages, and religions, Jammu and Kashmir is one of the most diverse regions on the subcontinent. Currently de facto control of this erstwhile princely state is divided between three states – India, Pakistan and China (to which Pakistan unilaterally ceded territory under its control in 1963 as part of a border agreement). There are several communities and nationalities living in their respective parts of Kashmir, usually known as Jammu and Kashmir state - areas currently administered by India - and Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas - areas currently administered by Pakistan.¹¹² In Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir there are two administrative divisions (Jammu and Kashmir) but three agro climatic zones - the cold desert of Ladakh, the temperate valley of Kashmir and the subtropical region of Jammu.

The ethnic stock (on the Indian side) is made up of Dogras, Punjabis, Kashmiris, Gujjars, Bakerwals, and Baltis while those living on the Pakistan administered side are Punjabi, Pathan, Balti, Dardi, Shin, Yashkun, Mongol, Tadjik Turkic and central Asian. In Jammu and Kashmir the principle languages are Kashmiri, Urdu, Dogri, Pahari, Balti, Ladakhi, Gojri, Shina and Pasto. The people of Ladakh are of Indo-Tibetian origin while the southern area of Jammu includes many communities tracing their ancestry to the nearby states of Punjab and Haryana as well as Delhi.

Though Islam is practiced by an estimated 67 percent of the overall population in the state and 97 percent of the population of the Kashmir valley, making it India's only Muslim majority state, the state also has large communities of Hindus (approximately 30 percent), Buddhists (approximately 1 percent) and Sikhs (approximately 2 percent).

¹¹² Although this note addresses all aspects of this conflict, it may be noted that the CORE project study will focus on the internal dimensions of this conflict, as they pertain to the Jammu and Kashmir state, i.e. the Indian part of Kashmir. Jammu and Kashmir is sometimes referred to only as Kashmir – The Kashmir problem or the Kashmir dispute – but the valley of Kashmir represents only one part of the territory of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Disaggregated data reveal that in the Kashmir valley Sunni Muslims are in the majority, but there is a miniscule proportion of the population who are Kashmiri Hindus called the Pandits¹¹³ along with a small population of Sikhs who continue to live in the valley. With around 66 percent Hindus are numerically in the majority in Jammu subdivision, but Muslims constitute a significant minority with 30 percent of the population. Buddhists are slightly in the majority in Ladakh. The rest are mostly Muslims with Shia Muslims mostly settled around Kargil.

The size of Jammu and Kashmir's population as per the 2001 Census of India figures was 10,069,917.¹¹⁴ From 1981-2001 the demographic growth rate throughout all districts was more than two percent with Kupwara and Srinagar (in Kashmir valley) recording a three percent growth rate. The burden of dependency in Jammu and Kashmir is quite high as only 43 percent of the population is in the productive age group. As the Jammu and Kashmir Development Report indicates this imbalance will remain an abiding concern.

Though the sex ratio in Jammu and Kashmir from 1951-2001 shows that there has been a marginal convergence, it is still below the Indian average. In 2001, eight districts had sex ratios below the state average and only Pulwama in the Kashmir valley was above the national average with 938 females per 1000 males.

According to the 2001 census 54.46 percent of Jammu and Kashmir's population was literate in comparison to the average Indian literacy rate of 65.38 percent. All districts hit by militancy including Srinagar district have low literacy rates, illustrating the effect of conflict on education.

113 An estimated 95 percent of the community found themselves forced to leave the valley following the onset of the militancy.

114 The figures in this section are sourced from the various chapters of Jammu and Kashmir Development Report by the State Plan division of the Planning Commission, available at http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/stateplan/sdr_jandk/sdr_jkch1.pdf, http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/stateplan/sdr_jandk/sdr_jkch2.pdf and http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/stateplan/sdr_jandk/sdr_jkch3.pdf last accessed on February 28, 2011 which in turn are based on the census of India figures of 2001. There was no census in Jammu and Kashmir in 1991 due to the disturbed conditions but the latest data on socio economic indicators will be available in the new census report for 2011 which will be published before the project closes.

The government of India has been keen to economically integrate Jammu and Kashmir with the rest of India, incentivizing the integration process through grants, subsidies and special packages. Ironically, this has fuelled cynicism and some sections of the population especially in the Kashmir valley have in the past denounced these “sops” as a tactic to divert attention from the political problem in the state. The state itself, however, is one of the largest recipients of grants from New Delhi and has one of the lowest incidences of poverty in the country at less than four percent. The benefits of these special packages do not always trickle down to the masses though as unemployment and underemployment among the educated segments of society constitutes one of the biggest challenges faced by the state.

A key sector of Jammu and Kashmir’s economy consists of agriculture and allied activities including dairy development, fisheries, livestock and sericulture. An overwhelming proportion of Jammu and Kashmir’s population is dependent on agriculture but this primarily remains a subsistence activity. Jammu and Kashmir was one of the first states in independent India to introduce progressive radical land reforms. However, tardy credit flows and insurance cover for major crops as well as the lack of emphasis on post harvest technologies including handling, storage, transportation, processing and marketing has created a suboptimal cycle of low productivity and investment. A big challenge for developing intensive agriculture is assured irrigation with less than half the cultivable area being irrigated.

A major lifeline of Jammu and Kashmir has been its forests, which beyond the wood-processing industries contributes to tourism and hydropower generation as well as to ecological sustainability due to the forests’ capacity to replenish the ground water table. Following the onset of armed militancy in the Kashmir valley, the forest department has lost effective control over the forests and a timber mafia has flourished.

Jammu and Kashmir has not been able to attract investment in industry and remains an industrially backward state. In fact there has been an overall decline in annual production, employment generated and even the number of production sites set up in the period 1995-

1996 to 2000-2001. The lack of investment in Jammu and Kashmir's industry can be attributed to a lack of security resulting from sporadic occurrence of political violence.

The small-scale industry however has witnessed rapid growth with around 73,000 SSI units in the state by 2001, 67 percent of which are generating employment in rural areas.

Jammu and Kashmir has long been facing the problem of unemployment. The last census in 2001 indicated that 43.36 percent of the total working population are cultivators, 6.74 percent are agricultural labourers and the remaining 49.9 percent are engaged in other activities including household industries. Female workers constituted 28.4 percent of the workforce according to a census conducted by Government of India in 1981 and 2001. An important aspect of the unemployment scenario in Jammu and Kashmir is the growing segment of educated unemployed youth, which ultimately looks to the government to provide jobs in the absence of employment opportunities in the private sector.

Famed for its scenic beauty tourism had been the backbone of the Jammu and Kashmir economy, but was badly hit by the backlash of reoccurring violence.

A working group set up by the Indian Prime Minister to look into the economic development of Jammu and Kashmir submitted its report in 2007, in which it refers to the state's "backwardness trap" characterized by low economic activity, low employment and low income generation. In order to ensure inclusive growth where "the benefits of growth translate into poverty reduction" and where "the poor contribute to the growth and the poor benefit from growth" the report points to the critical responsibility of the government in building social infrastructure by prioritizing better health and education and explicit employment generation through state intervention.

5.2 Background of the Conflict

Traditionally, the Kashmir conflict is viewed as a territorial dispute with high strategic, economic and political stakes for both sides. India controls less than half of the territory, Pakistan's share is almost 50 percent, while a small portion remains occupied by China.

Both India and Pakistan are claiming jurisdiction over the whole of Kashmir. The demarcation line between the Indian and the Pakistani controlled part is called the Line of Control.

The strategic heights of Kashmir and its location as a gateway to Central and South Asia and the Himalayan rivers rendered it a geo-strategically asset to both, India and Pakistan. Most importantly though, the conflict in Kashmir is rooted in two mutually exclusive ideologies, used to justify claims on its territory. On the one hand, Pakistan felt that the Muslim dominated state of Jammu and Kashmir should rightfully fall its control according to the logic of partition based on Pakistan's two-nation theory, suggesting that Hindus and Muslims constituted two separate nations. India, which explicitly rejected this line of thinking, regards the accession of the Muslim dominated Jammu and Kashmir as the acid test of her secular nation-building project. The outbreak of the armed insurgency in the Indian-administered part of the Kashmir valley in 1989 shifted the terms of discourse from the problem "of" Kashmir to the problem "in" Kashmir. This new rhetoric acknowledges an internal dimension of the problem in addition to the external Indo-Pak dimension of the problem (over which four wars have been fought till date). Internally, the Indian administration felt challenged by the widespread alienation among the population of Jammu and Kashmir from the state authority.

This along with the internal-external nexus to the problem (emanating from Pakistan's overt and covert support for Kashmir's armed insurgency) and the plurality of voices and identities within Jammu and Kashmir means that an imposition of the irreducible and homogenizing parameters of ideology and nationalism traditionally used for analyzing the Kashmir conflict will always be counter-productive. Even its majority community of Kashmiri Muslims is not a unified, homogenous entity in terms of its political beliefs, its ideological leanings, or the political goals of the decade-long insurgent movement in the Kashmir Valley. There are sharp divisions between those demanding that Jammu and Kashmir become an independent state, those seeking to merge with Pakistan, and those wanting to reconcile their differences with India through constitutional mechanisms guaranteeing their political rights. The Kashmiri political leadership hence cannot

necessarily speak for the diverse minorities of the state, including Gujjars, Bakkarwals, Kashmiri Pandits, Dogras, and Ladakhi Buddhists.

Across the Line-of Control, the Northern Areas also present a rich mosaic of languages, castes, different sects of Islam and cultural diversities. Hence, explaining the politics of this diverse area exclusively through the lens of political Islam obstructs a sound understanding of the issue. These areas are home to four separate denominations of Muslims – the Ismaili, Sunni, Shia and the Nur Bakhsi sects of Islam with Shia Muslims constituting the majority in Gilgit and Baltistan areas. Until 1994, political parties were not allowed to operate in the areas, which limits their political influence to this day.

Recognizing the rich, complex and multi-layered character of the Kashmir issue, (rather than reducing it to either a Hindu-Muslim problem or a Indo-Pakistan issue) is important not only for the recognition of the conflict's structural causes. Moreover, only a comprehensive analysis would be able to create critical political spaces that allow an exploration of ways and means to find a just, viable and lasting solution.

5.4 Conflict Actors and Agendas

There are several actors or players involved in this conflict, which can be identified at three levels: local, national and international.

Local Level (Jammu and Kashmir State):

The political forces in the Jammu and Kashmir State fall into four sets:

1. Traditional political parties like the National Conference, which continues to be the single largest political party and the PDP. The latter was founded as a regional party in 2008 in order to represent the new class of political leadership in the state, whose pro-Kashmiri stance is trying to appropriate the Hurriyat's political agenda without the latter's secessionist overtones.¹¹⁵

115 The All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) an alliance of parties and leaders was formed on March 9, 1993 as a political front to further the cause of self determination of the Kashmir.

2. The separatist groups believe that Kashmir's future remains to be decided along the lines of their ideological leanings, political strategies, and goals, without providing a unified platform on these issues. The largest political body representing the separatist agenda and an important player is the Hurriyat Conference, but it is sharply divided between moderate and hard-line factions. Jammu and Ladakh have never been represented in Hurriyat's executive council, but by the same token the authorities in Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas do not recognize its leaders as their representatives.
3. Active militant groups include Lashkar-i-Toiba, Jaish-i-Mohammed, Al Badr, and Harkat ul Mujahideen in its original as well as splinter formations - with the sole exception of Hizbul Mujahideen - which are Pakistan based.
4. The political leaders of the minority communities - the Kashmiri Pandits, Ladakhi Buddhists, Shia Muslims (of Kargil), Gujjars, Paharis, and Dogras - are also an important player. In order to achieve a sustainable resolution of the conflict, the central government must ensure that their political interests are safeguarded in any final settlement.

Local Level (Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas, under Pakistan's control)

The political forces in Azad Kashmir that can impact the peace process are:

1. Traditional players such as the Muslim Conference and Pakistan People's Party (PPP), which believe the Kashmir conflict revolves around the "other (the Indian) Kashmir" and hope to bring it into Pakistan's fold. In view of the clear ethnic divide between the Azad Kashmir's leaders with those in the Kashmir Valley, the former seek to negotiate a truly autonomous political status for themselves within Pakistan.
 2. The JKLF led by Amanullah Khan seeks a united, sovereign, and independent Kashmir.
-

3. The jihadi forces with the strength of more than one hundred organizations in Azad Kashmir are not much different in their character, goals, and strategies from the jihadi groups based in Pakistan.

In the Northern Areas, political forces are broadly organized sectarian Sunni and Shia organizations. The entire spectrum of political issues ranging from school curriculums to fundamental rights, representation, and the constitutional and legal status of the region is framed and debated along the Shia-Sunni divide. Other political groups in the Northern Areas, such as the All Parties National Alliance, the Gilgit Baltistan National Alliance, and the Balawaristan National Front (BNF) each represents a deeply alienated constituency. The BNF, in particular, is attempting to fashion a new, common identity with somewhat open and broadly based boundaries that accommodate not only the linguistic, religious, cultural, and social groups of the Northern Areas, but also reach out to their historical “kin” in Chitral and Ladakh.

National Players (India)

1. In India, important political stakeholders include the Congress, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government currently led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the BJP (the main opposition party, which started the peace process), and the smaller coalition partners of the Congress and the BJP that favor a deeper federalization of the Indian polity. Prime Minister Singh, who is committed to the peace process, has sought to secure India’s vital concerns by laying out the broad parameters of a possible final solution: no redrawing of boundaries on religious grounds and maximum autonomy in the domestic context, just short of secession.
2. The BJP traditionally advocated the abolition of Article 370 but adopted a pragmatic approach. The Vajpayee government’s readiness to break from the mould was also reflected in its response to the Hizbul Mujahideen’s unilateral cease-fire in the Valley that “insaniyat (humanism), not necessarily the Constitution, [should] provide the framework for the talks.” The BJP has also

abstained from supporting the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh's demand for the trifurcation of Jammu and Kashmir along communal lines.

3. The security forces (including the army, various paramilitaries, and the state police) constitute another significant player because of their role along the Line-of-Control and in counterinsurgency operations.

National Players (Pakistan)

1. The political forces in Pakistan include the key mainstream political parties such as the Pakistan Peoples Party and the Nawaz Sharif-led Muslim League (PML-N) who are unable to deliver on the peace process without the backing of the military establishment.
2. The Islamist political parties totally reject any compromise with India and support jihad.
3. Pakistan's military calls the shots on its Kashmir policy and has supported the jihadi groups operating in Kashmir as a tool of the state policy.
4. The jihadi groups in Pakistan have developed a reservoir of ideologically motivated men, weapons, and a vast terrain straddling the Pakistan-Afghan border with large pockets of sympathetic populations. These groups continue waging jihad in Kashmir with or without state protection, thus acquiring an independent dynamic.

International Players

The key international powers - the United States, Russia, China, and to a lesser extent the European Union (especially Britain) and Japan - do not have a direct stake in the resolution of the Kashmir conflict but have been involved from time to time. Their main objective has been to avert the risk of a nuclear war over Kashmir and to encourage bilateral India-Pakistan negotiations.

5.5 Governance Approaches and Institutions

Some important constitutional and formal institutional arrangements that are currently in place in the Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir include:

- **Article 370:** Article 370 of the Indian constitution which conferred a special status to Jammu and Kashmir. This provision has restricted the powers of the Indian parliament to make laws for Jammu and Kashmir unless these are ratified by the state legislative assembly except in those matters specified in the instrument of accession namely defence, communication and foreign policy. In reality, however, successive central governments, often with the complicity of regimes in Srinagar, have systematically dismantled Article 370. Its deep erosion may be illustrated by the fact that presently out of 395 articles in the Indian Constitution, 260 are applicable in Jammu & Kashmir. The remaining 135 are those for which there are identical provisions in the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. Only three of the 97 areas listed in the union list are still inapplicable in the state, as are 26 of the 47 entries in the concurrent list.
- **Jammu and Kashmir Constitution:** Jammu and Kashmir is the only state in India with its own constitution enacted in 1956.
- **Jammu and Kashmir State Legislature:** The constitution of Jammu and Kashmir provided for a bicameral legislature. At the time of drafting the constitution of Jammu and Kashmir 100 seats were earmarked for direct elections from territorial constituencies. Twenty-five seats out of these 100 were reserved for the areas of Jammu and Kashmir that are now controlled by Pakistan. Jammu and Kashmir has a multi-party system. The current state legislature was constituted following the 2008 Kashmir elections, in which the National Conference Party and the Congress Party together formed a ruling alliance.
- **Jammu and Kashmir Judiciary:** The Constitution Application Order of 1954 extended the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Under Art.32 (2-A) of the Constitution of India, the State High Court

was for the first time given the power to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights so far as they are applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1957 an independent judicial body with the High Court of Judicature at the top was created by the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution Act.

- **Leh and Kargil Autonomous Hill Councils in the Ladakh region**

In 1995, the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Council Act was enacted by the then central government led by P.V. Narasimha Rao. The Act provided for an Autonomous Hill Council each for Leh and Kargil, and an inter-district advisory council to advise them on matters of common interest to both districts, resolving their differences and preservation of communal harmony in Ladakh, with tenure of five years. This Act was subsequently passed by the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly as well.

However, the actual functioning of the institutions of government is mediated by the fractious and fractured politics in the state and the power relations in society. There are contestations around the accession itself, the absence of a shared understanding of the nature and scope of Article 370, the role of elections in Jammu and Kashmir and what it represents, players outside the formal institutional framework like the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC), sharp regional divides between Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh in terms of their diversity profiles and aspirations. Finally the presence of an overwhelming state security apparatus consisting of the Indian Army, several other paramilitary forces, and intelligence agencies has created its own set of dynamics with the administration and brought changes in the civil military equations of the state.

The Working Group on Ensuring Good Governance set up by the Prime Minister in 2006 in its report (2007) recognizes that human rights violations by the state and non-state actors have been a major cause of alienation. Hence it recommended among other things that the State Human Rights Commission be strengthened, the press and the civil society act as watchdogs, that human rights trainings be imparted on law enforcing agencies and that a high powered committee including political representatives and civil society members be set up for enforcing human rights. The report also considered effective

measures to provide adequate security to all segments of society particularly minority communities. Moreover it recommended that the security forces adopt a “citizen friendly approach” to ensure that while militancy is tacked, civilians are not harmed and their lives and property adequately protected. It also recommended setting up a minority commission to look into the problems of minorities.

Besides, it also suggested a plethora of measures to ensure responsiveness and efficiency in the administration. Most importantly, it has drawn attention to the importance of institutions of local self-governance particularly in rural areas to ensure people’s participation (Panchayati Raj institutions as they are called in India). The report pointed to their current moribund state in the Kashmir valley, urging that the 73rd amendment Act providing constitutional status to these institutions be accepted by the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly.¹¹⁶ Provided the legislative assembly heeds this advice, the forthcoming Panchayat elections in the summer of 2011 could become an important platform for local political competition.

The experience of governance in Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir indicates that making democratic institutions work in the midst of the militarisation of state and society and the existence of a political economy of patronage and violence represents a formidable challenge and requires a concerted political, will which is clearly absent.

¹¹⁶ Laws that apply to the rest of India do not automatically apply to Jammu and Kashmir as per article 370.

VI North East India

Table 6.1: Core indicators

State	Population	Population density per sq. km.	Decadal growth rate	Literacy	Sex ratio (females per 1000 males)	Official languages
Arunachal Pradesh	1,382,611	17	25.92%	66.95%	920	Hindi, Deori, Assamese, English, local
Assam	31,169,272	397	16.93%	73.18%	954	Assamese, Bengali (in the Barak Valley), Bodo (in Bodoland)
Manipur	2,721,756	122	18.65%	79.85%	987	Meiteilon
Meghalaya	2,964,007	132	27.82%	75.48%	986	Khasi, Pnar, Garo, Hindi, English
Mizoram	1,091,014	52	22.78%	91.58%	975	Mizo, English
Nagaland	1,980,602	119	-0.47%	80.11%	931	Nagamese, English
Tripura	3,671,032	350	14.75%	87.75%	961	Bengali, Kokborok

Source: The data on population, population density per square kilometer, decadal growth rate of population, literacy and sex ratio (females per 1000 males) are available from the Census of India 2011 (provisional figures).

6.1 Environment of the conflict

India's Northeast traces its formation as a region to the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 and the gradual reorganization of international borders around it both before and after it. As a result, it remains tenuously connected with the rest of India through a narrow corridor, the 'chicken's neck' or 'Siliguri Corridor'- as it is popularly known, in northern West Bengal, with an approximate width of 33 kilometers on the eastern side and 21 kilometers on the western side. This constitutes barely one per cent of the boundaries of the region, while the remaining over 99 per cent of its borders are international – with

China to the North, Bangladesh to the South West, Bhutan to the North West, and Myanmar to the East (Bhaumik 1996).

Presently the region comprises seven Indian states of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura – also known as ‘Seven Sisters’ and Sikkim incorporated into the Indian Union in 1974. With the exception of Nagaland that became a state in 1963, most of the states in the region were reorganized between 1971 and 1987 (Bhaumik 1996).

These states cover a total area of over 255,088 sq. km. (about 7.7 per cent of India’s territory) and, according to the 2001 Census of India, a population of 38,495,089 persons (roughly 3.74 per cent of India’s population). The region accounts for one of the largest concentrations of tribal people in the country - constituting about 30 percent of the total population - though with a skewed distribution of over 60 percent in Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland taken together. With the only exception of Kerala outside it, three states of the region - Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya contain an overwhelming majority of Christians (90.02, 87 and 70.03 percents respectively). The region is characterized by extraordinary ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic diversity, with more than 160 Scheduled Tribes belonging to five different ethnic groups and over 400 distinct tribal and sub-tribal groupings speaking about 175 languages, and a large and diverse non-tribal population as well concentrated mainly in Assam and Tripura (Bhaumik 2010)

While the Ahoms were successful in gradually consolidating greater parts of the region under a single political unit in course of their rule (1228-1826), court chronicles of the Kacharis (1515-1818), the Jaintias (1500-1835) and the Manipur Kings (1714-1949) etc. point out how it had historically retained varying degrees of independence into the nineteenth century when the British took over the region. Colonial rule took nearly a century to finally annex the entire region and exercised its control over the hills primarily as a loosely administered ‘frontier’ area thereby separating it from the ‘subjects’ of the otherwise thickly populated plains (Das 2003).

6.2 Background of Conflicts

India's Northeast has been the theater of the earliest and longest lasting insurgency in the country - in the Naga Hills – then a district of Assam, where violence centering on independentist demand commenced in 1952, followed by the Mizo rebellion in 1966 and a multiplicity of more recent conflicts that have proliferated especially since the late 1970s. According to one estimate, there are about 65 major militant organizations presently operating in the region. Every state in the region except for Sikkim is currently affected by some form of insurgent violence, and four of these (Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura) have witnessed scales of conflict that could – at least between 1990 and 2000, be categorized as low intensity conflicts in which fatalities were over 100 but less than 1000 per annum.

After the failure of the Agreement for Suspension of Operations with the Naga insurgents (1964-1967), the Government of India entered into separate ceasefire agreements - renewed from time to time till today, with two of the leading factions of National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) in 1997 and 2001. The Government of India and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah) are now reportedly involved in discussing 'substantive issues', while trying to reach a 'permanent and honorable' solution to the long-standing problem. Both Mizo National Front (MNF) and the Government of India signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 1986 and Pu Laldenga, the rebel leader, subsequently formed his own political party and became the Chief Minister of the Indian state of Mizoram. The United National Liberation Front (UNLF) – the armed opposition group active in the valley of Manipur questions the 'Merger Agreement' that the king of Manipur had signed with the Government of India in 1949 on the ground that the king was 'forced' to sign it 'under duress outside his kingdom' (Bhaumik 2010). The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) too questions Assam's inclusion in the Indian Union. Although attempts have been made to bring UNLF and ULFA to the negotiating table, no formal ceasefire agreement could yet be reached with either of these organizations (Das 1994).

The Government's response to these independence demands has so far ranged from deploying strong arm tactics of enacting extraordinary legislations (like, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1958 etc.) and 'firmly dealing with it' with the help of security forces to trying to reach some form of agreement with the insurgent organizations. Not all agreements have however been equally successful (Samaddar 2004).

Although landlocked on all sides, migration - whether from across the international borders or within - continues unabated due to a variety of factors and the region has frequently been rocked by violent tremors of acute xenophobic reactions against the 'foreigners'/outsiders. Inter-group conflicts based on mutually rivaling 'homeland' demands¹¹⁷ have of late sparked off widespread ethnic cleansing and internal displacement of population in the region (Samaddar 2005).

Tripura provides a classic case of how the tribals (once a majority in the kingdom) were slowly reduced to a minority, facing the threat of being dispossessed of their land, language and culture. The earliest chronicles available suggest that the state has had a substantial non-tribal Bengali population certainly since the fifteenth century, and the 1901 Census recorded 52.89 per cent of tribals in its population. This equation remained relatively stable till the early 1940s, when communal clashes in British-ruled East Bengal provoked a steady migration into princely Tripura. The trickle turned into a flood during and after Partition. By 1951, the tribal population had fallen to 36.85 percent and further to 28.44 per cent in 1981. The 1991 Census, however, indicated a marginal reversal of the trend, with the tribal population rising to 30.95 per cent. National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) – one of the major rebel organizations active in the state, for example, calls for expelling all Bengalis settling in the state after 9 September 1949 – the date of 'merger' of the princely state into the Indian Union (Das 2003).

The Government often finds it difficult to detect let alone deport the foreigners. The Assam movement (1979-1985) focused politicians' attention to the issue of the

117 For instance, between the Bodos and the non-Bodos, the Karbis and the Dimasas in Assam, the Nagas and the Kukis/Paites in the hills of Manipur, the Mizos and the Brus/Reangs in Mizoram etc.

foreigners. Estimates suggest their numbers to lie between 800,000 and 450,000. The Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) that came to power in 1985 after an agreement involving a highly complicated procedure of detecting, disenfranchising and deporting the foreigners was reached between the contending parties, was able to detect not more than 8000 of them over the course of its tenure (1985-1990) (Das 1994; Misra 2000; Baruah 2005; Banerjee, Basu Ray Chaudhury and Das 2005).

6.3 Formal and Informal Conflict Actors and Agendas

<u>Insurgent Group</u>	<u>Agenda</u>
United Liberation Front of Assam	Independence and Sovereignty of Assam
National Socialist Council of Nagalim (I-M)	‘Integration of Naga-Inhabited Areas’ and ‘Special Federal Relationship with India’
United Peoples’ Democratic Solidarity	Anti-Outsider Movement
All-Arunchal Pradesh Students’ Union	Anti-‘Foreigners’ Movement
Peoples’ Consultative Group	Facilitating Talks between ULFA and GOI
Jatiya Abhiwartin	

6.4 Approaches to conflict resolution – policies of regional partners

India’s Northeast refers to the easternmost region of India consisting of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura. This area is ethnically distinct from the other parts of India. The region is distinguished by a preponderance of the Tibeto-Burman languages. Strong ethnic cultures that had escaped Sanskritization effects permeate the region. These states form a special category. The North Eastern Council (NEC) was constituted as the nodal agency for the economic and social development of these states (Samaddar 2004).

The isolation of the Northeastern states began earlier as a result of British imperialism, when the region was cut-off from its traditional trading partners, like Bhutan and Burma and other parts of Southeast Asia. In 1947, the de-colonization of the Indian subcontinent

and partition made this region entirely landlocked, intensifying its isolation. Recently, however, this region has turned into an important zone in view of New Delhi's 'Look East' policy. With 98% of its borders with China, Myanmar, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Nepal, India's Northeast is home to many ethnic groups, which are engaged in self-preservation and movements for autonomy in many cases. Sometimes, these struggles have turned violent, leading to proliferation of armed insurgent groups, like the ULFA, NLFT, NDFB, NSCN (I-M), NSCN (K) and many such outfits. Soon after the Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962 and in view of the growing insurgencies in the region, the security discourse has become predominant (Das 2007; Das 2005).

In this context, the MCRG, in association with the other partners, would like to work particularly on identifying the possible pathways to peace in India's Northeast. For identifying the conflict resolution strategies, there will be a need to highlight the perspective of justice instead of a predominant perspective of national security. In case of the India's northeast, quite often the question of human security is neglected. The issue of displacement and the other humanitarian and human rights issues are also crucial. In this sense, there is also a need to study the phenomenon of state violence (Banerjee, Basu Ray Chaudhury and Das 2005; Das 2008; Hazarika 2000; Hazarika 1994; Rajagopalan 2008)

In view of all these, there is a need for multi-layered, multiple-level dialogues. Dialogue with the insurgents will not be enough. The dialogues will not be merely for ceasefires between the rebels and the state. Dialogue will be necessary with the members of different segments of the society. That would enhance the peace-building capacity of the society, in general. In India, however, the government usually views all kinds of initiatives for dialogues as anti-state (Samaddar 2004)

In countries like India, constitution and laws, hitherto enjoying a validity that stems from its origins in a colonial power, and therefore, substantively free from popular deliberations, now needs to self-explain – is it a collection of norms backed by the threat of state sanction or norms whose validity does not primarily stem from the state, but from the fact that these norms guarantee the autonomy of all legal persons equally? In fact, requirements of justice and reconciliation call for new modes of dialogue beyond constitutional prescriptions for mediation, compromise and restraint. (Samaddar 2004)

The question of justice, after all, appears to be critical in Bihar in the context of multiple and somewhat overlapping transitions from the colonial state to a post-colonial one, from a primary economy to a manufacturing one, from a state-supported economy to a neo-liberal one.

6.5 Governance: approaches and institutions

India's Northeast is a place, in some ways comparable to the Balkans, where the on-going protracted conflicts are myriad and multiple in nature. There is conflict between the state and societal groups, conflict among different ethnic groups sharing the same territorial space for centuries, as well as conflict between the union and state governments. To deal with this situation there are arrangements of federal administration, other institutional mechanisms for granting autonomy to the indigenous communities like the autonomous councils proposed in the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India. Moreover, there have been peace initiatives as the ongoing peace talks of the Government of India with the insurgent groups like NSCN (I-M) and ULFA (Das 1994; Baruah 2005; Basu 2006; Basu Ray Chaudhury, Das and Samaddar 2005)